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Abstract—Deep neural networks (DNN)-based machine learning
(ML) algorithms have recently emerged as the leading ML paradigm
particularly for the task of classification due to their superior
capability of learning efficiently from large datasets. The discovery
of a number of well-known attacks such as dataset poisoning, adver-
sarial examples, and network manipulation (through the addition
of malicious nodes) has, however, put the spotlight squarely on the
lack of security in DNN-based ML systems. In particular, malicious
actors can use these well-known attacks to cause random/targeted
misclassification, or cause a change in the prediction confidence,
by only slightly but systematically manipulating the environmental
parameters, inference data, or the data acquisition block. Most of the
prior adversarial attacks have, however, not accounted for the pre-
processing noise filters commonly integrated with the ML-inference
module. Our contribution in this work is to show that this is a
major omission since these noise filters can render ineffective the
majority of the existing attacks, which rely essentially on introducing
adversarial noise. Apart from this, we also extend the state of the art
by proposing a novel pre-processing noise Filter-aware Adversarial
ML attack called FAdeML. To demonstrate the effectiveness of the
proposed methodology, we generate an adversarial attack image by
exploiting the “VGGNet” DNN trained for the “German Traffic Sign
Recognition Benchmarks (GTSRB)” dataset, which despite having
no visual noise, can cause a classifier to misclassify even in the
presence of pre-processing noise filters.
I. INTRODUCTION
Machine learning (ML) has been the great success story of the
last decade. In particular, deep neural networks (DNN), which
can be efficiently trained to eke out the maximum information
from “big data”, is the standout ML framework that has revo-
lutionized diverse fields such as object recognition, information
retrieval, signal processing (including video, image, and speech
processing), and autonomous systems (with self-driving cars
a prominent example). The impressive performance of DNN-
based ML algorithms can be gauged from the fact that DNNs
now regularly outperform human beings in a rapidly increasing
number of domains that were historically considered amenable
only for human analysis and outside the reach of machine
algorithms—e.g., NLP, emotion recognition, and games such as
Go. But despite their great prowess and success, DNN-based ML
algorithms suffer from a critical problem: these algorithms, as
they are currently designed, are particularly vulnerable to security
attacks from malicious adversaries [1].
A major reason behind this security vulnerability of ML
algorithms stems from their implicit assumption that the testing
or inference data will be similar in distribution to the training
data, and that the model output would be sought in good faith by
a trusted benign interacting party. Unfortunately this assumption
flies in the face of any adversarial attempts to compromise the
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❑ How to validate the correctness of ML
algorithms in hardware implementation?
❑ How to securely execute ML algorithms on
third-party hardware accelerators?
Fig. 1: An overview of security threats/attacks and their respective payloads for
ML algorithms during training and inference [7]
ML system, where a mismatch between the distributions on
which the model is being trained and test is purposefully sought.
We can safely anticipate that incorporation of ML models in
critical settings (such as transportation, power grids) will make
them an immediate target for malevolent adversaries who will be
motivated to compromise these ML models and inflict massive
damage. Addressing the lack of security of ML algorithms,
therefore, assumes paramount importance and requires immediate
attention from the community.
DNNs in particular have been shown to be very vulnerable to
adversarial attacks. A striking example of DNN’s vulnerability
to adversarial examples1 was first brought to prominence in
2013/14 through the work of Szegedy et al. [2] who showed that
deep networks used for object recognition can be easily fooled
through input images that have been perturbed in an imperceptible
manner.2 Adversarial ML is now a burgeoning field attracting
significant attention [3]. An elaborate coverage of the history of
adversarial machine learning and the issues involved can be seen
in recent book-level treatments of adversarial ML [5], [6].
A. Types of Security Attacks on Machine Learning
With reference to Fig. 1, the major types of ML security attacks
are:
1“Adversarial examples” are minor perturbations of the input (so minor that
the changes could be visually imperceptible) especially crafted by the adversary
purposefully to maximize the prediction error [2], [3].
2Although the adversarial vulnerability of DNNs was pointed out in 2013/14,
the broader work on adversarial pattern recognition goes back further, at least till
2004 as outlined by Roli et al. in [4]
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Fig. 2: Threat Models: different attack scenarios based on the attack’s methodology and access to the different blocks during the ML inference
Firstly, training attacks or poisoning attacks, an attacker
can adversarially perturb (or ‘poison’) the training dataset, or
otherwise manipulate the learning model/architecture or tool,
with the goal of maximizing the classification error and denying
service (e.g., by classifying a benign user as an intruder) through
the injection of samples into the training data. For example,
an attack can modify the underlying network structure through
addition or deletion of parallel layers or neurons. In addition,
when the training is being outsourced to some remote provider,
other attacks (such as remote side-channel) can be used to steal
the intellectual property (IP).
Secondly, inference attacks or evasion attacks, the attacker
can attempt to steal the IP through a side channel or through
successive polling. The attacker can also perturb the inference
data to create “adversarial examples”. The goal in such attacks
is evasion at the test time or the inference time through the
manipulation of test samples [8], [9], [7]. Other possible attackers
can be indirect beneficiaries who can either manipulate the
inference data or intrude the hardware. Moreover, attackers can
also perform side-channel attacks for IP stealing (see Fig. 1). In
addition, the use of adversarial examples is an importance case
of an inference stage attack [10], [11], [12].
Lastly, hardware implementation attacks, the attacker seeks
to exploit the hardware security threats, such as the manipulation
of the hardware implementation of the trained ML model (hard-
ware Trojans, [13]) and IP stealing (e.g., through side-channel or
remote cyber-attacks) [14], [15]. Although a hardware intrusion
can be used to launch several attack payloads, it requires complete
access to the hardware blocks, without which these attacks are
difficult or impossible to perform. Moreover, several sophisticated
defense mechanism against the hardware attacks are becoming
available.
B. Challenges in Resisting ML Security Attacks
Unlike the traditional systems, the security of ML-based
systems is data dependent, which makes the job of ensuring
security more challenging. One of the most common attacks
is to exploit the data-dependency by manipulating/intruding the
training dataset [16], [17], [18] or the corresponding labels [19].
Similarly, the baseline ML algorithm and training tools can also
be attacked by adding new layers/nodes or manipulating the
hyper-parameters [13], [20], [21], [22], as illustrated in Fig.
1. Moreover, in the case of the outsourced training, remote
side-channel or cyber-attacks can be used to steal the IPs.
Although data poisoning and ML algorithms/tools/architectures
manipulation of attacks are quite effective, their effectiveness is
limited by their substantial assumption of having complete access
to information about the underlying ML architectures/baseline-
model and the training dataset.
C. Motivating Pre-processing Noise Filter-Aware Adversarial
ML
Although most current adversarial ML security attacks incor-
porate pre-processing elements (such as shuffling, gray scaling,
local histogram utilization and normalization) [23] in their design
and assume that an attacker can access the output of the pre-
processing noise filtering, getting this access requires hardware
manipulations and is practically difficult. If an attacker, on the
other hand, does not have hardware access to the pre-processing
filters, it becomes very challenging to incorporate the effect
of pre-processing along with noise filtering, which raises the
following key research questions:
1) How can we analyze the impact of pre-processing noise
filtering on adversarial examples?
2) How can we incorporate the effects of the pre-processing
noise filtering effects in the design of an improved adver-
sarial ML attack?
D. Novel Contributions
The major contributions of this paper are:
Firstly, we provide an elaborate analysis on the impact of the
pre-processing noise filtering on existing adversarial ML attack
strategies (Section III). We demonstrate that most state-of-the-
art adversarial ML attacks on classification can be neutralized
using pre-processing noise filters. Based on this analysis, and
our anticipation that future attackers will evolve new strategies
to defeat or even leverage pre-processing noise filters, we have
made our next contribution.
Secondly, we propose a new attack methodology, called pre-
processing noise-Filter-aware Adversarial ML or simply FAdeML,
which is able to exploit pre-processing noise filtering as part
of its attack strategy (Section IV). As far as we know, this is
the first work that has explicitly exploited noise filtering as part
of an attack strategy on the ML security. We demonstrate the
effectiveness of the proposed FAdeML attack methodology by
analyzying state-of-the-art adversarial attacks on the “VGGNet”
[24] DNN trained for the “German Traffic Sign Recognition
Benchmarks (GTSRB)” dataset [25] and show that FAdeML can
force a classifier to misclassify even in the presence of pre-
processing noise filters without any perceptible visual noise or
change in the overall accuracy of the DNN.
Open-source contributions: We will release our
design files, models, and attacks sources online at:
http://LinkHiddenForBlindReview for reproducible research.
II. BACKGROUND: THREAT MODELS AND ADVERSARIAL
ATTACKS
In this section, we will introduce the various attack/threat
models and then some common state-of-the-art adversarial ML
attacks.
A. Attack Threat Models
In order to systematically reason about security, we need to
articulate the threat model we are assuming: who are the possible
attackers? what is the intention of the attack? what are the poten-
tial attack mechanisms? is the attack targeted or indiscriminate?
[26]. It is usually a good practice to adopt a conservative security
attack model [6] and access for the “worst-case scenarios, but
the best strategy is to assess the system security using different
assumptions about the level of the adversarys capability. In this
paper, we assume the following three threat models:
1) Threat Model I: An attacker has access to the output of the
pre-processing noise filter and can perturb the image before
storing it into the input buffer of the ML modules; see Fig.
2(a).
2) Threat Model II: An attacker does not have access to the
output of the pre-processing noise filter or input buffers
of the ML module but it can manipulate the data before
acquisition; see Fig. 2(b).
3) Threat Model III: An attacker does not have access to
the pre-processing noise filter but it can directly perturb the
acquired data before storing it into the input buffer of the
ML modules; see Fig. 2(c).
B. State-of-the-Art Adversarial ML Attacks
An adversarial ML attack typically attempts to either reduce
prediction confidence or to cause a (random or targeted) misclas-
sification by adding an imperceptible purposefully crafted noise
into the data. It is assumed that an adversary’s knowledge may
encompass all, or part, of the following: details of the learning
algorithm; details of the parameters (e.g., feature weights); and
feedback on decisions. Analysis assuming perfect knowledge
provides an upper bound on the performance degradation that
can occur under attack. It is however usually fair to assume that
the adversary is not totally unconstrained—in particular, it is a
common assumption that an attacker can only control a given
small fraction of the training samples; and in the case of test-
time attacks can only enforce up to a certain maximum number
of modifications.
Based on the adversary’s knowledge about the targeted ML
model, we can classify adversarial attacks into two categories:
(1) a white-box attack, and (2) a black-box attack. In white-box
attacks, it is assumed that the adversary has complete knowledge
of the ML model including its architecture, training data, and
the hyper-parameters. In black-box attacks, the ML model is an
opaque black box for the adversary and no information (in terms
of the technique being used or the hyper-parameters) is assumed
to be available. It is however granted in black-box attacks that
the adversary can operate as a standard user who can query
the system with examples and note the model response. These
query/response pairs can then be used by the attacker to infer the
“ML black-box” and adversarial examples can be accordingly
crafted.
Most of these adversarial ML attacks operate according to the
following two-step methodology. Firstly, an attacker chooses the
target image/images or target output class/classes (in the case of
targeted misclassification) and defines the optimization goals, i.e.,
correlation coefficients, accuracy or other parameters to analyze
imperceptibility. Secondly, a random noise is introduced into
the target image to compute the imperceptibility based on the
defined optimization goals. If the optimum imperceptibility is
achieved, the intruded image is considered as an adversarial
image; otherwise, the noise is updated based on imperceptibility
parameters and a new image is generated.
Many adversarial attacks have been proposed in the liter-
ature such as the limited-memory Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-
Shanno (L-BFGS) method [2], [27]; the fast gradient sign method
(FGSM) [28], [29], [30] method; the basic iterative method
(BIM); the Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) [1]; the
one-pixel attack [31]; the DeepFool attack [32]; the Zeroth Order
Optimization (ZOO) attack [33]; the CPPN EA Fool [34]; and
the C&W’s attack [35]. However, to study the effects of pre-
processing noise filters on adversarial examples, in this paper,
we limit ourselves to the most commonly used attacks, i.e., the
L-BFGS, FGSM, BIM attack methods, which we briefly discuss
next.
1) The L-BFGS Attack: This method is proposed by Szegedy
et al. to generate an adversarial example in DNNs [2], [27]. The
basic principle of the L-BFGS method is to achieve the opti-
mization goal as defined in Equation 1, where noise represents
the perturbations and minimizing it represents its imperception.
The main limitation of the L-BFGS method is that it utilizes a
basic linear search algorithm to update the noise for optimization
which increases its converging time.
min ||noise||2 =⇒ f(x+ noise) 6= f(x) (1)
2) The FGSM Attack: To address the computational cost issue,
Goodfellow et al. proposed the FGSM algorithm for generating
adversarial examples with fewer computations by performing
a one-step gradient update along the direction of the sign of
gradient at each pixel [28], [29] Their proposed imperceptive
noise can be defined as η = 5x J(θ, x, f), where,  and η are
the magnitude of the perturbation and the imperceptible noise,
respectively. J is the cost minimizing function (based on original
image x, classification function f and cost with respect to target
class θ) obtained through stochastic gradient descent. So, the
generated adversarial example can be computed by adding η into
the targeted image. The main limitation of the FGSM method is
that these attacks are robust for white box attacks rather than for
the black box attack. Several variants of FGSM were proposed
to handle the white box assumption but increases it converging
time which limits its applicability in real-world applications [36].
3) The BIM Attack: Previous methods assume adversarial
data can be directly fed into the DNNs. However, in many
applications, people can only pass data through devices (e.g.,
cameras, sensors). Kurakin et al. applied adversarial examples
to the physical world [30] by extending the FGSM algorithm
by running a finer optimization (smaller change) for multiple
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Fig. 4: VGGNet: Conv1 (64 output filters), Conv2 (128 output filters), Conv3 (256
output filters), Conv4 (512 output filters) and Conv5 (512 output filters)
iterations. In each iteration, the authors proposed to clip the pixel
values to avoid large changes on each pixel. The main limitation
of the BIM method is that it ignores the pre-processing stages
after acquiring the data.
III. EFFECT OF PRE-PROCESSING NOISE FILTERING ON
ADVERSARIAL ML
In this section, we propose our analysis methodology for
studying the effects of the pre-processing noise filter on adver-
sarial security attacks during the ML inference. Our analysis
methodology comprises the following steps (also illustrated in
Fig. 3):
1) We initially choose an attack method from the adversarial
attack library to generate adversarial examples according
to their corresponding optimization functions and scaling
methods.
2) Inference is then performed on a trained DNN model to
compute the classification probabilities for the generated ad-
versarial examples assuming Threat Model I (which assumes
that the attacker can access the pre-processing noise filter’s
output).
3) Inference is also performed on the same trained DNN model
using the same adversarial examples, but now assuming
Threat Model II or III, and classification probabilities are
computed.
4) Finally, we compare the difference between the classification
probabilities computed under the assumptions of Threat
Models I and II/III, using the following cost function:
f(cost) =
5∑
n=1
P (Cn)− P (C∗n) (2)
where, Cn and C∗n ∈ {C1, C2, ..., C5}, P (Cn) and P (C∗n)
represent the top five predictions/classes for particular in-
put/adversarial example, under the assumptions of the Threat
Models I and II/III and their respective classification prob-
abilities.
A. Experimental Setup
To demonstrate the effectiveness of our analysis methodology,
and to analyze how state-of-the-art adversarial attacks perform in
the presence of noise filters, the following experimental setup is
used:
1) DNN: we use VGGNet model, which is composed of five
convolutional layers and one fully connected layer (Fig. 4).
2) Pre-processing Noise Filter: We implement the filters local
average with neighborhood pixels (LAP) and local average
with radius (LAR). For comprehensive analysis, we use five
distinct configurations of LAP each for different number
of neighboring pixels np = 4, 8, 16, 32, 64 and radius
r = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.
3) Dataset: we use the German Traffic Sign Recognition
Benchmarks (GTSRB) dataset
4) Adversarial Attacks and Threat Models: we use the L-
BFGS, FGSM, and BIM attacks and assume Threat Models
I and II/III.
5) Payload: We perform five targeted misclassification scenar-
ios, i.e., (i) stop sign to 60km/h; (ii) 30km/h to 80km/h; (iii)
left turn to right turn; (iv) right turn to left turn; and (v) no
entry to 60km/h.
B. Experimental Analysis
In this section, we discuss the two analyses that we per-
formed based on the aforementioned experimental setup under
the assumptions of Threat Model I (Fig. 5) and II/III (Fig.
7), for the selected adversarial attacks. The analysis in Fig. 5,
which assumes the Threat Model I, shows that the implemented
adversarial attacks successfully performed misclassfication for all
the attacking scenarios. Though, adversarial noise is invisible but
still the adversarial examples have an (up to 10%) on the overall
top 5 accuracy of the VGGNets for complete GTSRB dataset.
The analysis in Fig. 7, which assumes the Threat Models II/III,
however shows that the smoothing filters (LAP and LAR) can
nullify the impact of the adversarial examples on classification,
but the attack is shown to affect the top 5 accuracy of overall
DNN. The detailed discussion and insights of this is given below:
1) L-BFGS and FGSM: The LAP filters nullify the effects
of L-BFGS filters but the top 5 accuracy is also reduced
by 10%, as shown in Fig. 5. However, if we increase the
number of “np” then the accuracy improves but it decreases
after np = 32. In the case of LAR filters, the top 5 accuracy
starts decreasing after r = 4. The impact of LAP and LAR
filters on FGSM attacks follows similar trends. This impact
is more pronounced on L-BFGS because its optimization
function is highly dependent on the sharp edges or sudden
changes in data samples, which are removed by smoothing
filters. Moreover, both of these attacks do not consider
the effect of pre-processing while designing adversarial
examples. Therefore, in the presence of smoothing filters,
they still reduce confidence of the network by decreasing
the top 5 accuracy.
2) BIM: This analysis shows the smoothing filters also nullify
the effects of this attack. Since, this attack considers the
feedback from the pre-processing, therefore, the effects of
this attack is nullified when smoothing strength is relatively
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high. This has a significant impact on the confidence even
after filtering effects, as shown by the confidence values of
all scenario in Fig. 7, similarly, the top 5 accuracy of the
network increases with increase in number of neighboring
pixel (till np = 32) or radius (r = 3) for local average filters.
However, further increase in the neighboring pixel (till np >
32) or radius (r > 3) decreases the top 5 accuracy because
it compromises some of the distinguishing features as well,
as shown in the top 5 accuracy analysis of Fig. 7.
C. Key Insights
1) The adversarial noise from the adversarial examples that
are gradient descent based can be removed by applying the
smoothing filters, i.e., LAR or LAP. However, the attacks
do still reduce the confidence of the overall classification.
2) The selection of smoothing parameters in LAR or LAP has
a direct impact on the top 5 accuracy of the DNN. Top 5
accuracy increases with increase in smoothing parameters till
a certain value, e.g., for LAP and LAR values are np = 32
and r = 4. When going beyond this threshold value, the top
5 accuracy starts to decrease because of the degradation of
input image/sample quality.
3) To perform a successful adversarial attack, the effects of
all the pre-processing stages should be considered while
optimizing the adversarial noise.
IV. PRE-PROCESSING NOISE FILTERING-AWARE
ADVERSARIAL ML
The methodology of our proposed pre-processing noise filter
aware FAdeML attack comprises the following steps, shown in
Fig. 8:
1) We initially choose a reference sample “x” to be perturbed
and a sample of the targeted class “y” for the misclassifica-
tion such that prediction(x) 6= prediction(y), and choose
an attack from the adversarial attack library.
2) We compute the prediction/classification probabilities for
sample “x” and “y”, assuming Threat Model I, to
identify the difference between their respective predic-
tion/classification probabilities by computing the following
cost function: f(cost) =
∑5
n=1 Px(Cn)− Py(C∗n)
3) We compute and add the adversarial noise “n” to “x” to
generate the adversarial example “x∗” (i.e., x∗ = η×n+x),
where, η is the noise scaling factor to make it imperceptible.
4) We then compute the prediction/classification probabilities
for “x∗”, assuming Threat Model II or III, to identify
the impact of pre-processing noise filtering on generated
adversarial example “x∗”.
5) We then analyze the difference between the predic-
tion/classification probabilities of adversarial example “x∗”,
assuming Threat Models I and II/III, based on the cost
function of Equation 2.
6) Finally, we repeat the optimization depending upon the se-
lected algorithm to incorporate the impact of pre-processing
noise filtering.
x∗ = η × (n+ δn
δf(cost)
) + x (3)
A. Experimental Analysis
To illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed FAdeML attack
methodology, we utilize the same experimental setup (discussed
in Section III-A). We performed experiments to those shown
in Fig. 9 for the proposed FAdeML attacks, and identified the
following key observations:
1) FAdeML attack performs better even in the presence of
pre-processing filters, because these attacks incorporates the
smoothing effects of low pass pre-processing noise filters
(i.e., LAP or LAR).
2) Another key observation is that the attack confidence reduces
slightly because the smoothing effect also compromises the
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Fig. 7: The traditional adversarial attacks, i.e., L-BFG, FGSM and BIM, are neutralized by pre-processing low pass filters, i.e., LAP and LAR, (under the assumptions
of Threat Models II and III), in the expense of confidence reduction.
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Fig. 8: The proposed methodology to design FAdeML Attacks to incorporate the
Impact of Pre-processing Noise Filtering on Adversarial ML
sudden changes, which are then exploited by most of the
adversarial attacks.
3) Similar observation can be depicted from the analysis pre-
sented in Fig. 9. It shows that top 5 accuracy of the network
increases with increase in number of neighboring pixel
(till np = 32) or radius (r = 3) for local average filters.
However,further increase neighboring pixel (till np > 32)
or radius (r > 3) decreases the top 5 accuracy because it
compromises some of the distinguishing features as well.
B. Key Insights
1) The effectiveness of the adversarial noise can be increased
significantly by optimizing it with respect to pre-processing
stages, especially noise filtering.
2) The effects of gradient-descent function optimized adversar-
ial noise can be nullified because they rely heavily on the
sudden changes in the input images/samples.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed an analysis methodology to under-
stand the impact of pre-processing filter on adversarial attacks and
an attack methodology to incorporates these effects into the ad-
versarial examples. We have demonstrated the effectiveness of the
proposed analysis and attack methodology using three state-of-
the-art attacks (L-BFG, FGSM and BIM) on the “VGGNet” Deep
Neural Network (DNN) trained on the “German Traffic Sign
Recognition Benchmarks (GTSRB)” dataset. The experimental
results shows that the effects of existing adversarial attacks on
classification can be nullified by applying the smoothing filters,
LAP and LAR, on the input samples before sending it the
DNNs, even though the confidence classification is still affected.
Based on this analysis, we developed a new pre-processing
noise-Filter-aware Adversarial ML (FAdeML) attack and showed
that FAdeML is able to force a misclassification even after the
application of the smoothing filters. Although previous work
in the related literature has explored using pre-processing for
defense purposes, we are the first to explicitly exploit noise
filtering to improve an adversarial ML attack. We will open-
source our designs. Our overall goal through this work is to
communicate to the community the potential vulnerabilities of
current ML systems and thereby inspire researchers to develop
ML architectures that are effective yet can resist adversarial
examples.
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